יורה דעה קכ״זYoreh De'ah 127

Se’if 1א׳

הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ: נִתְנַסֵךְ יֵינְךָ, אִם הוּא בְּיָדוֹ, נֶאֱמָן. וַאֲפִלּוּ אִם אֵינוֹ עַתָּה בְּיָדוֹ, שֶׁכְּבָר הֻחְזַר לַבְּעָלִים, אִם בְּפַעַם רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁמְּצָאוֹ אָמַר לוֹ: נִתְנַסֵךְ יֵינְךָ, נֶאֱמָן אֲפִלּוּ אִם הַבַּעַל מַכְחִישׁוֹ. אֲבָל אִם אֵינוֹ בְּיָדוֹ, וְלֹא אָמַר כֵּן לַבַּעַל בְּפַעַם רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁרָאָהוּ, וְאָמַר לֵיהּ אַחַר כָּךְ, אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן אִם הַבַּעַל מַכְחִישׁוֹ תּוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּבּוּר (מָרְדְּכַי פֶּרֶק הָאוֹמֵר), אוֹ אוֹמֵר: אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ; אֲבָל אִם שָׁתַק, שְׁתִיקָה כְּהוֹדָאָה דַּמְיָא. הַגָּה: וּמְלַמְּדִים אוֹתוֹ לְכַתְּחִלָּה שֶׁיֹּאמַר: אֵינִי מַאֲמִינְךָ, וְאָז לְכֻלֵּי עָלְמָא שָׁרֵי, דִּבְעָלִים נֶאֱמָנִים עַל שֶׁלָּהֶם (טוּר). וְאִם אֵין הַבְּעָלִים מַכְחִישִׁין אוֹתוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּכְחִישׁוֹ אַחֵר, לֹא מְהַנֵי (הַגָּהַת מַיְמוֹנִי פי"א), מֵאַחַר שֶׁהַבְּעָלִים שָׁם וְשׁוֹתְקִין; אֲבָל אִם אֵין הַבְּעָלִים שָׁם, מְהַנֵי, (אָרֹךְ). וְיֵשׁ מִי שֶׁכָּתַב דְּעֵד אֶחָד בְּהַכְחָשָׁה לָאו כְּלוּם הוּא (רַשְׁבָּ"א סי' תקמ"ה), וְאִם הַבְּעָלִים אוֹמְרִים: אֵינִי מַאֲמִינְךָ, אַף עַל גַּב דִּבְלִבּוֹ מַאֲמִין לוֹ כְּבֵי תְּרֵי, אֵין לְהַחְמִיר (בֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם מָרְדְּכַי). וְדַוְקָא בְּיַיִן נֶסֶךְ שֶׁאֵין לְדַקְדֵּק בּוֹ כָּל כָּךְ, אֲבָל בִּשְׁאָר אִסּוּרִים לֹא מְהַנֵי אִם אָמַר: אֵינִי מַאֲמִינְךָ, אִם מַאֲמִין בְּלִבּוֹ (אָרֹךְ כְּלָל י"ג). וְהוּא שֶׁיֹּאמַר לוֹ: נִתְנַסֵךְ יֵינְךָ בְּפָנֶיךָ, אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ: יָדַעְתָּ, דְּרַגְלַיִם לַדָּבָר. וְאִם שָׁתַק, וְאַחַר כָּךְ הִכְחִישׁוֹ, וְאָמַר: מַה שֶּׁשָּׁתַקְתִּי תְּחִלָּה, לֹא בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁהוֹדֵיתִי, אֶלָּא לְהִתְיַשֵּׁב וְלַחֲשֹׁב בְּלִבִּי לִזְכֹּר אִם הוּא אֱמֶת, נֶאֱמָן. הַגָּה: וְאִם לֹא הִגִּיד לוֹ בְּפַעַם רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁמְּצָאוֹ, וְאוֹמֵר לוֹ אַחַר כָּךְ וְאָמַר אֲמַתְלָא לָמָּה לֹא אָמַר לוֹ בָּרִאשׁוֹנָה, יֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ לִדְבָרָיו (הַגָּהוֹת מָרְדְּכַי פ' הָאוֹמֵר). וְכָל מִי שֶׁנֶּאֱמָן עַל דָּבָר וְעֵדִים מַכְחִישִׁים אוֹתוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ מִגּוֹ שֶׁהָיָה נֶאֱמָן לְאָסְרוֹ בְּעִנְיָן שֶׁלֹּא הָיוּ הָעֵדִים מַכְחִישִׁין אוֹתוֹ, מִכָּל מָקוֹם מֵאַחַר שֶׁמַּכְחִישׁ הָעֵדִים הֲוָה לֵהּ מִגּוֹ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים, וְאֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן אֲפִלּוּ בִּדְבַר אִסּוּר, מִכָּל מָקוֹם לְדִידֵהּ אָסוּר מִשּׁוּם דְּשַׁוְיֵהּ אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָה דְּאִסּוּרָא. (כֵּן מַשְׁמָע מִבֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם תְּשׁוּבַת הָרַשְׁבָּ"א). טַבָּח שֶׁעָשָׂה סִימָן בִּבְהֵמָה כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁעוֹשִׂין בִּבְהֵמוֹת טְרֵפוֹת, וְאוֹמֵר עָלֶיהָ שֶׁהִיא טְרֵפָה, וְחוֹזֵר וְאוֹמֵר שֶׁכְּשֵׁרָה הִיא, וְלֹא אָמַר כֵּן תְּחִלָּה, רַק שֶׁתִּשָּׁאֵר לוֹ לִקַּח מִמֶּנָּהּ (בָּשָׂר), יֵשׁ מִי שֶׁאוֹמֵר מֵאַחַר שֶׁנּוֹתֵן אֲמַתְלָא לִדְבָרָיו, נֶאֱמָן. וְעַיֵּן לְעֵיל סִימָן א' מִדִּין עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בְּאִסּוּרִים. ב' אַחִים אֵינָם אֶלָּא כְּעֵד אֶחָד לְעִנְיַן אִסּוּרִים (תְּשׁוּבַת הָרַשְׁבָּ"א סִימָן תקמ"ד). וְכָל הַפְּסוּלֵי עֵדוּת כְּשֵׁרִים לְעִנְיַן אִסּוּרִים, אִם לֹא שֶׁחָשׁוּד לְאוֹתָם דְּבָרִים (ר"ן). אֶחָד שֶׁאוֹמֵר לִשְׁנֵי שֻׁתָּפִים: נִתְנַסֵּךְ יֵינְכֶם, וְאֶחָד שׁוֹתֵק וְהַשֵּׁנִי מַכְחִישׁוֹ, לָזֶה שֶׁשּׁוֹתֵק, אָסוּר; וְלַשֵּׁנִי וּלְכָל הָעוֹלָם, שָׁרֵי (הַגָּהוֹת אַלְפָסִי).

One who says to his fellow, "Your wine has been made yayin nesach (wine poured out as an idolatrous libation)": if it is in his hand, he is believed. And even if it is not now in his hand, for it has already been returned to the owner, if on the first occasion that he met him he said to him, "Your wine has been made yayin nesach", he is believed, even if the owner contradicts him. But if it is not in his hand, and he did not say so to the owner on the first occasion that he saw him, and said it to him afterwards, he is not believed if the owner contradicts him within the time of an utterance (Mordechai, chapter "One who says"), or says, "I do not know"; but if he was silent, silence is as an admission. Hagah [Rema]: And they instruct him at the outset that he should say, "I do not believe you", and then it is permitted according to all, for owners are believed as to what is theirs (Tur). And if the owners do not contradict him, even though another contradicts him, it does not help (Hagahot Maimoni, chapter 11), since the owners are there and are silent; but if the owners are not there, it does help (Issur v'Heter haAroch). And there is one who wrote that one witness where there is contradiction is nothing (Rashba, siman 545). And if the owners say, "I do not believe you", even though in his heart he believes him as two witnesses, there is no ground to be stringent (Beit Yosef in the name of the Mordechai). And this is specifically in yayin nesach, in which one need not be so exacting; but in the other prohibitions it does not help if he says, "I do not believe you", where he believes it in his heart (Issur v'Heter haAroch, klal 13). And that is where he says to him, "Your wine was made yayin nesach in your presence", or where he said to him, "You knew of it" — for there are grounds for the matter. And if he was silent, and afterwards contradicted him, and said, "That I was silent at first was not because I admitted it, but to settle my mind and to consider in my heart, to recall whether it is true" — he is believed. Hagah [Rema]: And if he did not tell him on the first occasion that he met him, and tells him afterwards, and gave a plausible excuse why he did not tell him at the first, there is ground to be concerned for his words (Hagahot Mordechai, chapter "One who says"). And anyone who is believed in a matter and witnesses contradict him — even though he has a migo (a plea he could have made in which he would have been believed), in that he would have been believed to forbid it in a manner in which the witnesses would not have been contradicting him — in any case, since he contradicts the witnesses, his is a migo in the face of witnesses, and he is not believed even in a matter of prohibition; nevertheless, for himself it is forbidden, because he has made it for himself a piece of forbidden food. (so it is implied from the Beit Yosef in the name of a responsum of the Rashba) A butcher who made a mark on an animal in the way that they do with animals that are tereifot (animals with a fatal defect), and says of it that it is a tereifah, and then goes back and says that it is fit, and did not say so at first only so that it should remain for him to take (meat) from it: there is one who says that, since he gives a plausible excuse for his words, he is believed. And see above, siman 1, concerning the law of one witness being believed in matters of prohibition. Two brothers are only as one witness with regard to prohibitions (a responsum of the Rashba, siman 544). And all those who are disqualified for testimony are fit with regard to prohibitions, unless he is suspected in those matters (the Ran). One who says to two partners, "Your wine has been made yayin nesach", and one is silent and the second contradicts him: for the one who is silent it is forbidden, and for the second and for all the world it is permitted (Hagahot Alfasi).

Se’if 2ב׳

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים, כְּשֶׁעוֹשֶׂה עִמּוֹ בְּחִנָּם, אוֹ אֲפִלּוּ בְּשָׂכָר וְהוּא בְּעִנְיָן שֶׁלֹּא יַפְסִיד שְׂכִירוּתוֹ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁאוֹמֵר שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵךְ בְּאֹנֶס אוֹ שֶׁשְּׂכָרוֹ דָּבָר מֻעָט, אֲבָל אִם שְׂכָרוֹ הַרְבֵּה, וְהוּא בְּעִנְיָן שֶׁמַּפְסִיד כָּל שְׂכָרוֹ, כְּגוֹן שֶׁאוֹמֵר שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵךְ בִּפְשִׁיעָתוֹ, נֶאֱמָן אֲפִלּוּ אֵינוֹ עַתָּה בְּיָדוֹ וְגַם לֹא אָמַר לֵהּ בְּפַעַם רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁמְּצָאוֹ. הַגָּה: וְדַוְקָא שֶׁאוֹמֵר שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר הַיַּיִן בְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהוּא גָּלוּי וְיָדוּעַ לַכֹּל שֶׁמַּפְסִיד שְׂכָרוֹ, כְּגוֹן בִּפְשִׁיעָה שֶׁנִּזְכַּר, אֲבָל אִם אָמַר בְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹמַר שֶׁטָּעָה הַפּוֹעֵל, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מַפְסִיד שְׂכָרוֹ, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁמַּפְסִידוֹ עַל פִּי הַדִּין, אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן (רַבֵּנוּ יְרוּחָם).

In what case are these words said? Where he works for him for nothing, or even for a wage and it is in a manner in which he will not lose his hire — such as where he says that it was made yayin nesach under compulsion, or where his hire is a trifling thing. But if his hire is much, and it is in a manner in which he loses all his hire — such as where he says that it was made yayin nesach through his own negligence — he is believed even if it is not now in his hand and even though he did not tell him on the first occasion that he met him. Hagah [Rema]: And this is specifically where he says that the wine became forbidden in a way that is revealed and known to all to be one in which he loses his hire, such as by the negligence that was mentioned; but if he said it in a way in which it is possible to say that the labourer erred, so that he does not lose his hire — even though by law he does lose it — he is not believed (Rabbeinu Yerucham).

Se’if 3ג׳

עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בְּאִסוּרִים, לְהַתִּיר, אֲבָל לֹא לְהַחְמִיר. הַגָּה: מִיהוּ יֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים, דִּבְדָבָר דְּאִכָּא לְבֵרוּרֵי, כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ אֶחָד: בֹּא וְאַרְאֶךָּ עוֹבֵד כּוֹכָבִים מְנַסֵּךְ יֵינְךָ, צָרִיךְ לָחוּשׁ לִדְבָרָיו (בֵּית יוֹסֵף בְּשֵׁם הַתּוֹסָפוֹת). וְכָל דָּבָר שֶׁלֹּא אִתְחַזַּק לֹא לְהֶתֵּר וְלֹא לְאִסּוּר, עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן עָלָיו אֲפִלּוּ לְאָסְרוֹ (אֲשֵׁרִי פֶּרֶק הַנִּזָּקִין וּמָרְדְּכַי פ' הָאִשָּׁה רַבָּה). וְכָל הֵיכָא דְּאִתְחַזַּק דָּבָר בְּאִסּוּר, כְּגוֹן טֶבֶל אוֹ חֲתִיכַת בָּשָׂר שֶׁאֵינָהּ מְנֻקֶּרֶת, אֵין הָעֵד נֶאֱמָן עָלָיו לְהַתִּירוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן בְּיָדוֹ לְתַקְּנוֹ (ג"ז שָׁם). וְאִם הָיוּ בְּכָאן ב' חֲתִיכוֹת, אַחַת שֶׁל אִסּוּר וְאַחַת שֶׁל הֶתֵּר, נֶאֱמָן הָעֵד לוֹמַר: זֶה הֶתֵּר וְזֶה אִסּוּר (הר"ן שָׁם). וְאָדָם נֶאֱמָן עַל שֶׁלּוֹ, וַאֲפִלּוּ הֵיכָא דְּאִתְחַזַּק אִסּוּרָא (שָׁם בַּאֲשֵׁרִי). וְעַיֵּן לְעֵיל סי' קי"ט דִּין הֶחָשׁוּד עַל הַדָּבָר, אִם מֵעִיד עָלָיו. וְע"ל סִימָן קפ"ה מִי שֶׁאוֹמֵר: פְּלוֹנִי חָכָם הִכְשִׁיר לִי זֶה, וְהֶחָכָם כּוֹפֵר. וְעַיֵּן בְּאֶבֶן הָעֵזֶר סִימָן קנ"ב אִם אַמְרִינָן לְגַבֵּי עֵדוּת שֶׁהַפֶּה שֶׁאָסַר הוּא הַפֶּה שֶׁהִתִּיר. וְאִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת בִּדְבַר אִסּוּר לוֹמַר: תִּקַּנְתִּיו (ר"ן פֶּרֶק הָאוֹמֵר וְרֵישׁ חֻלִּין), וְדַוְקָא בְּוַדַּאי אִסּוּר, כְּגוֹן נִקּוּר בָּשָׂר וְכַדּוֹמֶה, אֲבָל בְּסָפֵק שֶׁמָּא אֵין כָּאן אִסּוּר, כְּגוֹן שֶׁצְּרִיכָה לְבָרֵר דָּגִים טְמֵאִים מִטְּהוֹרִים (א"ו הָאָרֹךְ), אוֹ אִסּוּר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ צְדָדִים לְהָקֵל (שָׁם בְּרַ"ן). אֵין אִשָּׁה נֶאֱמֶנֶת, דְּאִשָּׁה דַּעְתָּהּ קַלָּה לְהָקֵל. קָטָן אֵין לוֹ דִּין עֵד לִהְיוֹת נֶאֱמָן בְּאִסּוּרִין (ריב"ש סִימָן רמ"ה) ; מִכָּל מָקוֹם בְּקָטָן חָרִיף וּבָקִי בַּדָּבָר, וְאִכָּא רַגְלַיִם לִדְבָרָיו, יֵשׁ לְהַחְמִיר אִם מֵעִיד עַל דְּבַר אִסּוּר (רַשְׁבָּ"א סִימָן כ"ד). וְאִם מֵעִיד עַל אִסּוּר דְּרַבָּנָן לְהָקֵל, וְלֹא אִתְחַזַּק אִסּוּרָא, כְּגוֹן בְּדִיקַת חָמֵץ, נֶאֱמָן, דְּהִמְנוּהוּ רַבָּנָן בִּדְרַבָּנָן (שָׁם בריב"ש) ; אֲבָל אִם אִתְחַזַּק אִסּוּרָא אֵינוֹ נֶאֱמָן כְּלָל.

One witness is believed in matters of prohibition, to permit, but not to be stringent. Hagah [Rema]: However, there are those who say that in a matter that can be clarified — such as where one said to him, "Come and I will show you an idolater (oved kokhavim — the standing term for a gentile) making your wine into yayin nesach" — he must be concerned for his words (Beit Yosef in the name of the Tosafot). And anything that has not been established either as permitted or as forbidden — one witness is believed concerning it even to forbid it (the Asheri, chapter "Those who are injured", and Mordechai, chapter "The woman, the greater"). And wherever a thing has been established as forbidden — such as tevel (produce from which the priestly and levitical gifts have not been separated), or a piece of meat that has not been porged — the witness is not believed concerning it to permit it, unless it is in his power to set it right (this too there). And if there were here two pieces, one of forbidden food and one of permitted food, the witness is believed to say, "This one is permitted and this one is forbidden" (the Ran there). And a man is believed as to what is his own, and even where a prohibition has been established (there, in the Asheri). And see above, siman 119, the law of one who is suspected in the matter, whether he may testify concerning it. And see below, siman 185, one who says, "Such a one, a sage, declared this fit for me", and the sage denies it. And see in Even HaEzer, siman 152, whether we say with regard to testimony that the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. And a woman is believed in a matter of prohibition to say, "I set it right" (the Ran, chapter "One who says", and the beginning of Chullin); and this is specifically in a certain prohibition, such as the porging of meat and the like. But in a doubt, where perhaps there is no prohibition here — such as where she has to sort unclean fish from clean ones (Issur v'Heter haAroch), or a prohibition in which there are grounds to be lenient (there, in the Ran) — a woman is not believed, for a woman's mind is light to be lenient. A minor does not have the status of a witness, to be believed in matters of prohibition (Rivash, siman 245); in any case, with a minor who is sharp and expert in the matter, and there are grounds for his words, there is ground to be stringent if he testifies concerning a matter of prohibition (Rashba, siman 24). And if he testifies concerning a prohibition of the Rabbis to be lenient, and no prohibition has been established — such as the search for leaven — he is believed, for the Rabbis gave him credence in what is of the Rabbis (there, in the Rivash); but if a prohibition has been established, he is not believed at all.