The Shulchan Aruch · Choshen Mishpat
חושן משפט א׳Choshen Mishpat 1
Siman 1 of 427 in Choshen Mishpat — 6 se'ifim
הלכות דייניםJurisprudence· siman 1
Se’if 1א׳
מינוי השופטים בארץ ובחוצה לארץ. ובו ו סעיפים: בזמן הזה דנים הדיינים דיני הודאות והלוואות וכתובות אשה וירושות ומתנות ומזיק ממון חבירו שהם הדברים המצויים תמיד ויש בהם חסרון כיס אבל דברים שאינם מצויים אע"פ שיש בהם חסרון כיס כגון בהמה שחבלה בחבירתה או דברים שאין בהם חסרון כיס אע"פ שהם מצויים כגון תשלומי כפל וכן כל הקנסות שקנסו חכמים כתוקע לחבירו (פי' שתוקע בקול באזנו ומבעיתו) וכסוטר את חבירו (פי' מכה בידו על הלחי) וכן כל המשלם יותר ממה שהזיק או שמשלם חצי נזק אין דנין אותו אלא מומחים הסמוכים בא"י חוץ מחצי נזק צרורות מפני שהוא ממון ואינו קנס:
In these time judges judge the laws of confessions to a loan, loans, kesuba of a woman, inheritance, gifts, and cases which damage anothers money(assets, or income) because these cases are common always. Case which are not common even though there is a loss of money for example a animal that wounds another animal, or cases which are common but don't have a loss of money such as paying double (when fined for stealing an item) and such is the case with all fines that the sages instituted like a fine for when someone blows in into his friends ear and scares him, or hits his friend, and so to in any case where they required one to pay more then the principal amount of damage or where you would be required half the damage we don't judge them. they may only be judged by specialist who have smicha in Israel. Except in the case where you pay half the damage for damage caused by pebbles (such as when an animal walks and it kicks up pebbles and they cause damage) because this is a loss of money, and not a fine (a fine is extra punishment to the value of a principle damage)
Se’if 2ב׳
אדם שחבל בחבירו אין מגבין דיינים שאינם סמוכים בא"י נזק צער ופגם ובושת וכופר אבל שבת וריפוי מגבין: הגה וי"א שאף ריפוי ושבת אין דנין (טור בשם הרא"ש) ולא ראיתי נוהגין לדקדק בזה רק כופין החובל לפייס הנחבל ולקנסו כפי הנראה להם (ד"מ לדעת מהר"ם בפסקיו סי' ר"ח) וכמו שיתבאר בסמוך סעיף ה':
[In the case of] a man who injured his fellow-man — [the law is that] Judges who are not duly ordained in the Land of Israel18, supra par. 1, n. 1. cannot order the payment for injury,19Tur citing Yad, Sanhedrin V, 10. Derived from Mishna B.K. VIII, 1 and Gemara ibid. 84a-b where it is stated that the liability for injury (נזק) is determined by regarding the injured person as if he were a slave sold in the market place and an assessment is made as to how much he was worth before the injury was inflicted and how much he is worth now. Although there is a monetary loss involved, yet since this is of infrequent occurrence, Judges nowadays cannot order the payment thereof (v. par. 1). Much more so in the case of pain (צער) and indignity (בושת) where no monetary loss is involved that payment cannot be ordered by present day Judges. pain,19Tur citing Yad, Sanhedrin V, 10. Derived from Mishna B.K. VIII, 1 and Gemara ibid. 84a-b where it is stated that the liability for injury (נזק) is determined by regarding the injured person as if he were a slave sold in the market place and an assessment is made as to how much he was worth before the injury was inflicted and how much he is worth now. Although there is a monetary loss involved, yet since this is of infrequent occurrence, Judges nowadays cannot order the payment thereof (v. par. 1). Much more so in the case of pain (צער) and indignity (בושת) where no monetary loss is involved that payment cannot be ordered by present day Judges. blemish,20Yad ibid. and Tur a.l. do not include blemish (פגם). TaZ states that M’s version of the of the Talmud (B.K. 84b) did not have ‘blemish.’ MS.M. also omits ‘blemish’ although found in cur. edd. Liability for blemish applies only in the case of rape (v. E.H. § 177). Blemish stands on an equal footing as injury (v. B.K. ibid., Rashi s.v. ופגם). It may, however, be asked, why blemish (פגם) which is of frequent occurrence and involves a monetary loss (B.K. ibid.) should not be adjudicated today? This difficulty may be removed if we realize that ‘frequent occurrence’ of blemish applies only to the assessment, i.e., we know how to determine the liability of blemish (the difference in valuation between a virgin בתולה and a non-virgin בעולה), but the actual act of rape is of infrequent occurrence — M.E. indignity,19Tur citing Yad, Sanhedrin V, 10. Derived from Mishna B.K. VIII, 1 and Gemara ibid. 84a-b where it is stated that the liability for injury (נזק) is determined by regarding the injured person as if he were a slave sold in the market place and an assessment is made as to how much he was worth before the injury was inflicted and how much he is worth now. Although there is a monetary loss involved, yet since this is of infrequent occurrence, Judges nowadays cannot order the payment thereof (v. par. 1). Much more so in the case of pain (צער) and indignity (בושת) where no monetary loss is involved that payment cannot be ordered by present day Judges. and indemnity,21Lit. ‘ransom price.’ This is omitted by Yad ibid and Tur a.l., for “indemnity’ refers only to a case where an animal killed a person but has no reference to a general case of ‘injury.’ Caro for the sake of brevity states here blemish (פגם) and indemnity (כופר) along with the other items although the former belong to a different category of injury, but since all these items are similar in that they are not adjudicated by present day Judges they are mentioned together — M.E. but they may order the payment for loss of time and healing.22Yad ibid., derived from Raba’s dictum in B.K. 84a, ‘Payment for which the injured person would have to be valued as if he were a slave is not collected in Babylon,’ which is explained (thus Kes. Mish.; B.Yos.; MaHaRIK Rt. 1 a.o.) as referring to ‘injury’ (נזק) only, which, it is true, involves a monetary loss, but is of infrequent occurrence (v. supra n. 19). Hence, Raba’s dictum does not include ‘loss of time’ and ‘healing.’ Consequently, payment may be ordered by a Jewish Court today for the latter. Thus also Isserlein in his Decisions (פסקים) — that nowadays we may order payment for ‘healing’ and ‘loss of time’ and likewise impose a fine upon the offender. Asheri and Alfasi, however, hold that payment for the latter are not ordered today. Raba’s dictum is explained by them to refer to anything that requires valuation (כל הנישום). Caro, however, accepts the opinion of Maim. since it is supported by the Geoninm (Yad ibid.). Thus also Hag. Asheri to B.K. ibid. Gloss: And some say that also [cases of] healing and loss of time they23Present day Judges. do not adjudicate.24Tur on the authority of Asheri — G. , supra n. 22 and San. 2a Rashi s.v. וחבלות. However, I have not seen [them] adopt [this] practice, [viz.,] to be strict in this [matter]25But contra Caro, payment for ‘healing’ and ‘loss of time’ is not ordered today. save that they coerce the injurer26In D.M., Isserles adds ‘to heal him and etc.,’ i.e., in order to appease the injured person. For were we not to compel him to appease the injured person, an individual would feel free to injure his fellow-man and be exempt. , infra par. 5 and notes. to appease the injured [with money] and to penalize him according to that which appears [reasonable] to them27D.M. in accord with Isserles’ opinion to the Decisions (of Isserlein) s. 208 — G. as will be explained anon par. 5.
Se’if 3ג׳
בהמה שהזיקה את האדם אין גובין נזקו דיינים שאינם סמוכים בא"י מפני שהוא דבר שאינו מצוי אבל אדם שהזיק בהמת חבירו משלם נזק שלם בכל מקום וכן בהמה שהזיקה בשן ורגל הואיל והיא מועדת (להן) מתחלתה הרי זה דבר מצוי ומגבין אותו דיינים שאינן סמוכין בא"י וכן מי שגנב או גזל מגבין ממנו הקרן בלבד: הגה וי"א דוקא גזילות דשכיחי כגון כופר בפקדון וכדומה אבל גזילה ממש לא שכיחא ואין דנין אא"כ הגזילה קיימת מחייבין להחזירה (נימוקי יוסף פ' החובל):
[With respect to] cattle that injured man, — [the law is that] Judges who are not duly ordained in the Land of Israel28, supra par. 1, n. 1 may not collect payment for his injury because it is a matter that is not of frequent occurrence.29, B.K. 2b where it is stated that ‘man is cautious’ and Rashi explains that it is more difficult to injure a man than an animal since he possesses foresight. However, a man who caused damage to his fellow-man's cattle pays full damages everywhere.30Whether in or outside the Land of Israel. As in the case of one who tears his fellow-man’s garment or breaks his vessels or mutilates his shoots. Likewise, cattle that caused damage by means of Tooth and Foot, since [with respect to the latter] it is regarded as Mua'd ab initio, this is considered a matter of frequent occurrence, and Judges who are not duly ordained in the Land of Israel28, supra par. 1, n. 1 may order the payment thereof.31Yad, Sanhedrin V, 11-12. Derived from B.K. 84a-b in the case of the ox that chewed the hand of a child and Raba ruled, ‘Go forth and value the child as if it were a slave,’ and after a lengthy discussion in the Talmud (ibid.), Raba’s dictum, viz., that payment may be collected in Babylon where chattel was damaged by cattle, is explained to have reference to damage done by Tooth or Foot which is considered Mu‘ad ab initio. For Mu‘ad v. Glos. Thus also, [with respect to] one who stole or robbed32This refers to the unlawful acquisition of chattels by violence. Cf. Lev. V, 23; II Sam. XXIII, 21. [an object], they may collect from him the principal only.33Yad, Sanhedrin V, 1 , B.K. 84b where it is concluded that in matters of a penal nature we do not act as agents of the former authoritative Judges of Israel. Hence, only the principal may be collected. , also B.K. 115a where such cases were dealt with in Babylon and B.K. 96b in the case of the man who misappropriated a pair of oxen and B.K. 21a in the case of a certain person who built a villa on the ruins that belonged to orphans and when R. Naḥman advised the defendant to make a peaceful settlement with the orphans, he refused to do so, whereupon R. Naḥman confiscated the villa. Cf. also ibid. 37a and 4b. In the latter reference it is stated that theft (גניבה) and larceny (גזילה) involve civil liability. A difficulty, however, presents itself, viz., in the Mishna San. I, 1 and Gemara ibid. 3a we are told that cases of larceny are dealt with by Mumḥin Judges only, which contradicts the present ruling. Tosaf. (ibid. s.v. שלא; B.K. 84b s.v. אי נמי; Git. 88b s.v. אי הכי) explain that the Mishna ibid. refers to cases of larceny by means of injury inflicted (גזילות ע״י חבלות), in which case only Mumḥin Judges may adjudicate the matter. Hence, in such cases of larceny we nowadays cannot act as the agents of the former authoritative Judges, since this is a matter of infrequent occurrence, but cases of larceny where no bodily injury resulted we may act as the agents of the former. Thus also Kes. Mish. and B.Yos. N.Yos., however, removes the above difficulty as follows: Caro’s ruling that we may order the payment of the principal in cases of larceny refers only to matters of frequent occurrence, such as, one who denies a deposit (v. Gloss anon), but actual larceny is of infrequent occurrence. Hence, it is not adjudicated today (v. D.M. a.l.). ShaK advances a different opinion, viz., that in San. ibid. we deal with the adjudication of fines, e.g., the repayment of the double amount, the four and five-fold restitution, which require only Mumḥin Judges (v. supra par. 1 and notes), but the actual principal is recoverable even by laymen Judges (this is however, a stained interpretation, since the payment of the double etc., refers to cases of theft but not to larceny — Ba’er Heteb). ShaK also writes that the increment (שבח) of the misappropriated article prior to the owner’s resignation, is also recoverable today contra BaḤ. RaN and N offer an altogether different explanation in removing the above difficulty, viz., that as to San. ibid. that requires Mumḥin in cases of larceny, it has reference only to the period when such Judges were available, but if, as today, Mumḥin are no longer available, even laymen Judges may deal with such matters. Thus also Nethiboth, K.H. and Tummim. Otherwise, the earth will become full of violence — A.H. Gloss: And some say [that this applies] only to cases of larceny that are of frequent occurrence, e.g., [a guardian] who denies [having received] a deposit and the like, but actual larceny is not [considered] of frequent occurrence and they do not adjudicate [this] unless the robbed object is [still] intact, [in which case] they order [him] to return it.34N.Yos. to B.K. 84b — G. , previous note.
Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat — Lemberg 1898 edition, via Sefaria — public domain
English: Sefaria Community Translation — CC0
English: Code of Hebrew Law, tr. Chaim N. Denburg, Montreal 1955 — CC BY